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Selection and rules (below)

Of: Mr. Mao by scoring method, the final choice program is C. However, assuming a preference for other people to know that he will be able to give all parts A, which makes A win. Others may take a similar approach, and have every reason to do so. This is the voting strategy of the situation. In addition, when some people know they are most in favor of the proposal will not be elected, they will turn to vote for the second best solution to avoid the possibility of worse happening. Theoretically, one vote rule on the strength of preference more sensitive to strategic behavior, the greater the opportunities offered. strategic behavior is another aspect of trading votes, in the simple majority rule, the winner will get the majority of the failure of minority interests may be less than the price paid. In this case, few people may try to trade votes in order to prevent this from happening. At this time of the vote trading may have two situations: First, some people bribe others to enable them to vote for their favored programs. Second, some sort of agreement both in support of a class of problems on the Party B, Party B in exchange for support of another party on the issue. In such a transaction without prejudice to the case of a third party, vote trading help improve Pareto efficiency, because it is clear that the parties only if at least one trading profit, and without prejudice to any party, it can be relevant parties agree. Trading votes in favor efficiency, but it will cause high transaction costs and thus make the complicated political process is not conducive to democratic politics, so politics is often restricted or even prohibited, rather to encourage abstention, not to encourage transaction. Third, both the complex voting method or rate the voting method, although the increase in the possibility of resolving the paradox of voting, but they still may be voting paradox. Fourth, a single peak Theorem Arrow's impossibility theorem shows that any kind of public choice of voting methods are not completely solve the voting paradox, because any public choice rules can not meet the five conditions proposed by him. According to many scholars, single peak preference is to meet the five conditions of the premise. Personal preference form, if appropriate restrictions, it is possible to change the preferences of multiple peaks, in order to address voting paradox. Duncan Black, this single peak made famous theorem. He believes that the individual preferences through appropriate restrictions, making it suitable for a particular type, the majority decision results to satisfy the transitivity assumption. Single peak Theorem is satisfied if the voters prefer the single peak, and the number of voters is odd, then the majority will meet the transitive law. the mathematical meaning of a single peak is: Let n be a voter's utility function U1 (X), ..., Un (X), Ui (X) (i = 1, ..., n) is defined in to choose the set S of social states, then the two-dimensional plane, hence S marked on the horizontal axis, the Ui (X) (i = 1, ..., n) form the vertical axis, then at least An arrangement of S, so Ui (X) has a peak geometry. decided to vote above the results of the voting procedure in practice is to use the limited domain approach to the preference for a single peak. Such as for A, B, C three programs, you can restrict the domain of first preference A and B, both compared to B than A, with a single peak; to limit the domain of B and C, comparing the two B better than C; then restrict the domain of A and C, both compared to C than A. Most of the results of such a decision can be passed to meet the conditions, social choice preference order is B> C> A. single peak theorems show that the preference structure of a single peak, the majority decision is a result of stability. This paradox results of the vote to overcome the instability. However, although the creation of a single peak theorem of the continuity of social preferences, but contrary to the unrestricted domain assumption. Thus, in voting practice, but a single peak theorem also shows how to create, in theory, the voting results, and does not address personal preferences derived from the collective preference. theorem of the single peak, but Black is still meaningful. Because it gives preference derived from the conditions of the collective preference for an alternative formulation. But also gives personal preferences derived from social preferences and to avoid the possibility of voting paradox. Theorem shows that a single peak, the voting paradox less likely to occur, because in most cases, the individual preference structure will be showing a single peak shape. Why? A representative of the budget assumes a low level, B the middle level of the budget on behalf of, C on behalf of a high level of budget, said in probability, C> A> B> C appear in the order of personal preference is unlikely, because most people do not think the high amount of the budget than the low budget is good, and that the lower the amount of the budget better than the medium-sized budget. from the mathematical point of view, if y on behalf of the ideal target number of personal preferences to choose x on behalf of the social state, then, in the majority voting rules can not exist in the probability of the winner is x , y of the function, can be written as: p = f (x, y) In this formula, p that there is no possibility of voting results, f that the function relationship. This function is an increasing function. This shows that, as long as x increases, or y increases, or both x and y increase, the majority vote is likely to be evenly matched, regardless of the outcome. This shows that, in a highly inconsistent and the large number of society, between individuals is difficult to reach a more satisfactory results. In contrast, in a more unified society, between individuals there is a certain degree of consistency of preferences will, when several people or more will have a common ideals and goals, so the n reduced to produce a majority vote increase the likelihood of the winner. 戈登图洛克 public choice scholars that in the real world, is always greatly exceeded the number of voters voted for the number of social status. At this time, there is the probability of voting paradox is so small that in fact may not consider it. At this time, there is high probability of the same, and then the other options put forward or support costs can be higher than the benefits of the program. If the actual voting results do most of the state near the middle, the result will be accepted by all. Tullock remarks may be verified to be fact, but it helps to explain why direct democracy voting system easier to reach than the indirect result of the voting system of voting, voting paradox not easily lead to the reasons to show that direct democracy very easy to destroy the democratic system and thus has greater reason for the instability. In the direct democracy system of voting, the turnout is always much higher than the number of programs to be voted, the voting paradox occurs when the probability is very small. Easier to reach agreement on this point, which means that direct democracy is conducive to rapid decision-making, which is difficult to change personal preferences case, will be conducive to democratic stability and policy continuity. However, if the individual's preferences to change, you can easily create the conditions for the most authoritarian to destroy the democratic system itself. In an indirect democracy, the voters tend to be limited to a few people, then reduce the number of voters, while the options are relatively easy to make, when the voting results would be difficult to achieve consistent results. As in Britain, voters are always limited to the Conservative Party, Labour Party and among the other major parties, voters reduced the number of proposed options and more convenient to make voting difficult to achieve consistent results. In this case, in a state of society the number of options have been identified under the premise of the more democratic decision-making process, the voting result is more uncertain and unstable, the more volatile government policy. Of course, due to the small number of voters, a proposal is easier to reach consensus more difficult, time is also conducive to the conservative tendency to stability in the previous voting patterns. Therefore, the effectiveness of a single peak theorems have some practical background. Theorem can be derived from the single peak from the middle voters theorem. The theorem that, in preference to meet the single peak of a simple majority rules, victory at the polls will be the most voter support for the middle of the program. From the perspective of social stratification, the middle income voters tend to have intermediate or property of residents, that is, the middle class or middle class. Single peak Theorem assumes that each voter will not be an intermediate state too bad that he can only take one extreme, and can not simultaneously go to the other extreme. This is actually a metaphor for the majority of votes will be cast in the middle of programs. the middle of a formal voter theorem is Downs (A. Downs). He published in 1957, policy will minimize welfare losses of a group. Median voter theorem states that any political party or politician, in order to obtain a very large number of votes, must make their election programs and programs consistent with the wishes of the middle voters. Conversely, any political party or politician, if you want to win the election victory, must remain moderate. In addition, if a majority of members of the society living in middle-class status, then the whole society more extreme option is not possible, the more unlikely revolutionary or counter-revolutionary. More stable political, social and economic life conditions the more rational, not extreme. Therefore, the stability of the middle class and democracy has a very close relationship. five, transaction costs addition to unanimity, majority rule, ordinal voting rules, scoring rules such as voting, there is one name system electoral system, proportional representation and other more for complex models. The model also has its own characteristics, and produce interesting results of public choice, such as single-name system to create two-party electoral system, because the single-name system electoral system limits the domain; proportional representation would create a multiparty system, because its wide range of options . This shows that the limit domain, helps to create unique and stable solution. in the above study, we did not examine any transaction costs, problem selection rules. In other words, we examine the selection rules, in fact, assumed that the external conditions of zero transaction costs. However, in practice, transaction costs are not zero. Each has its own rules of public choice transaction costs. Transaction costs are the rules of public choice determinants of the choice, we should be based on the level of transaction costs, to deciding what the rules of public choice. public choice, transaction costs include: choice voting system administrative costs, the cost of participation in decision-making process, the voting results of the implementation costs and the efficiency of the allocation of costs. Cost to participate in decision-making process, it can be further divided as bargaining costs and opportunity costs. Negotiation cost is to obtain a number of members of the community agreed to adopt a tax or a sub-program of public spending to pay the price. Opportunity cost of delayed implementation of a proposal to pay the opportunity cost. Obviously, the larger community, the greater the transaction costs of decision-making. according to different rules in different transaction costs, we can find the lowest transaction costs of a simple majority, but unanimity is clearly the highest transaction costs. But not so that the majority voting rule is an effective decision-making rules, can not say that is worth pursuing all the same. In fact, the implementation of the same principle, it is tantamount to recognize any person has veto power, this will lead to tyranny of the minority, will weaken the community's capacity for action. In turn, collective action to restrict the ability of the government, the best way is to use transaction costs are also higher voting rules. This is a free government, rule of law, government, democratic government more often than autocratic governments lack the capacity of collective action, and therefore more able to achieve the ideal of limited government the reason. Of course, if the implementation of democratic government is only a simple majority rule, democratic government will also have the tyranny of the majority, resulting in most of the exploitation and oppression of the minority pattern. This is actually a mob of democratic government the government, it free, the rule of law than the government, more likely to abuse of power. Therefore, the modern government are actually free, the rule of law, a mixture of democratic government, it is based on freedom, rule of law as a framework, the limited context of democracy and effective government. the political balance of the fourth quarter and constitutional politics Public choice and market choice refers to the relative choice of the public domain. Buchanan and Tullock is the founder of public choice theory. They argue that individuals first, to the constitutional framework, to achieve a political balance, using a reliable constitutional system, to achieve limited government. a political balance ideal is no government public choice of public choice, everyone has full freedom of the society. Buchanan believes that aspects of freedom: tummy sleeping. Then he is free. Unfortunately, his illness because the body can only select a sleep method, then he is also free. According to Buchanan's view, individual freedom, should be in a free market conditions, it is free to bargain and sign contracts, where people can enjoy freedom. They assume that action. Utility maximization, including any can bring happiness and fulfillment, or something of value. That person is self-interest in the market so, in the public domain as well. Public choice is the main results of the field in the market, self-interested people a free choice to achieve economic balance and achieve common prosperity, but in the public domain, self-serving people is the result of free choice of political balance, the equilibrium result is the zero-sum game, or even all rational, irrational society Nash equilibrium pattern. Free-riding, big government, the consequences of rent-seeking, and so are very poor performance of the political equilibrium. in the public domain, if a certain policy choices to meet a person without prejudice to the interests of any of the conditions agreed to be taken to select the rules. As the price agreed is very expensive, it is not the cause of nothing, that is, often have to bribe to the objectors. Therefore, the selection rules for the public sector tend to be inclined to respect the majority's opinion,[link widoczny dla zalogowanych], the majority of the minority principle of unconditional obedience. the implementation of the principle of majority rule, will naturally lead to the consequences of big government. Assume 100 people through the principle of majority to establish a government to rule themselves. Under the rule of the majority rules, any 51 people can take collective action, even if such action must be paid by the other 49 people as part of the price. Most of the 51-member group of 51 is not necessarily the same person, so people can organize 51 people to take any coercive action, and let the other 49% of people pay a portion of the cost. Since the majority of the majority is always able to rely on the principle of exploitation of minority interests, people will increasingly rely on majority rule approach to take a few people a lift. The results of the expanding public sphere, that is, the government expanded the market shrinking. government expansion led to rampant rent-seeking. In this, public choice scholars are not land owners lease the land seeking the collection of rents, which means It includes In this sense, the requirements of government restrictions on Japanese car imports of GM lobbyists are rent-seekers. Ask for a raise bureaucratic rent-seeking persons. Against the opposition to import restrictions and those who are rent-seeking bureaucrats who pay. In short, an act or omission by the government to get the benefits of rent-seeking behavior, any behavior is to block other people's behavior is also rent-seeking rent-seeking behavior. rent-seeking behavior is not commonly referred to as profit seeking behavior. Seeking Profits behavior is a productive effort, which contribute to social well-being, but non-productive rent-seeking behavior involves the use of resources, such as lobbyists time and talent is the use of non-productive. To be used for productive activities, resources for unproductive rent-seeking activities and reduce the total wealth. Tullock rent-seeking as the maximize the effectiveness of the bureaucracy is also a selfish individual rent seekers. They are most concerned about their jobs, wages and allowances, as are their future work depends on their state government departments, so they are particularly concerned about where their work sector expansion, hoping to have more staff, more and more budget. Their efforts to expand the functions of government departments, while seeking to oppose or may result in budget cuts to streamline its personnel development. In each fiscal year to the end of the last penny they spent, for fear of a surplus year after next year's budget will be cut. At the same time trying to prove that the annual budget will be insufficient scale. For rent-seekers, they die while complaining about why the bureaucracy, why not decline, while you try to support the bureaucracy, because once really dead, and no chance to rent-seeking rent-seekers had. the same as the bureaucracy, military personnel who are seeking selfish. They always stressed the importance of national security, the possibility of exaggerating the foreign forces of aggression in order to maintain a huge military expenditure, to maintain more military. voters motivated to vote but also to promote their own interests. They chose those who can meet their legislators desire. Also driven by self-serving legislators, their re-election order, they are more likely to consider when voting interest of those particular voters, and as much as possible does not matter the cost allocated to other voters. Expansion of the lawmakers asked the government for increased government expenditure is greater than the pressure required to streamline government, reduce the budget pressures, so the government has been expanding, and when the revenue can not maintain government spending, the government will be borrowing debt, the implementation of deficit financing, Manufacturing inflation tax in disguise. Therefore, public choice scholars, government is trying to depend on others for all living things, government is the source of rent-seeking. Expansion is the principle of government under the rule of the majority of people active selection. At this time, we must establish a reliable system of constitutional government and protect individual freedom, protection of the market, restrict the power of the majority, to curb the expansion of the government to curb rent-seeking, and change the political balance of benign and malignant political equilibrium. Second, constitutional constraints Buchanan and Tullock in the Their research is not descriptive, nor is historical, but logical. They studied the constitutional question is not how human beings developed the Constitution, nor what kind of a constitution in the Constitution, under the historical conditions, but in the constitutional theory of government which affect the process of a rational, logical, is the largest utility of the framers. According to Buchanan and Tullock's view, the logic of the Framers is full of fear rather than hope. They doubt the government, that government is the biggest threat. They care about how to protect themselves, much less about the Government will help them solve their problems and progress. In order to protect individual freedom, constitutional requirements they must unanimously agree on the circumstances under which force, to each individual the right to veto, the government will not waste any taxpayer money. Anarchy, people can have full freedom, but once anyone is free to force others, the result is likely to be all against all Hobbes's state of war. If anyone can take advantage of the rules agreed to give veto power, the government will accomplish nothing in the public domain. Agreed that the Government will be completely ineffective, or have partners to refuse to pay bribes, so it is itself expensive. Therefore, the inevitable logic of the Framers on the principle of majority rule choice. However, the principle of majority rule will inevitably lead to the proliferation of big government and rent-seeking. Therefore, the constitutional constraints are bound to develop most of the power, the constitutional protection of minority rights arrangements, the government must be limited constitutional government. Buchanan proposed constitutional economics, the basic principles of constitutional politics. He believes that people have bad side, there are good, but no other purpose. People are selfish, in the public domain once the master of power, it will have Sungongfeisi, then even if there are many selfless, as long as people selfish, Sungongfeisi are bound to happen. Therefore, system, in particular to prevent. Buchanan analyzes the constitutional economics of taxation, intervention, and the application of constitutional reform issues in three areas. He believes that the tax field, the key question is outside the tax collected in the market for goods and services as the demand for private providers who and what impact economic behavior. Tax theory, whether neoclassical or in the specifications in the empirical assumptions on both the selection process for the tax itself is exogenous. Public choice and political decision-making is assumed to be endogenous. Additional burden on the tax base the severity of a variety of sorting and selection of a variety of tax base than the size of government revenues under the sorting and selecting important. The key issue is the tax structure and fiscal system of political decision-making interactions. Keynesian advocated the use of government budget to achieve macroeconomic goals, ignoring the political decision-making structure on the budget. Public choice shows that democratic government spending rather than taxation like to tend to the tendency of the budget deficit. Buchanan believes that in the Post-Keynesian era, when political actors have lost their previous moral constraints most effective, need to limit the deficit to the formal rules of facility to ensure responsible fiscal decisions. Buchanan believes that redistribution through government policy to achieve fair distribution, in a democratic government, the possibility of redistribution policies to achieve equitable interest group politics can be achieved depends on fair distribution. However, the public choice research shows that In this case, you need to set up appropriate institutional arrangements, which restricts competition among interest groups, making it possible to use the competition among interest groups to achieve public interest. short, only a fully competitive market mechanism in order to derive from the collective preferences of individual preferences, can the public interest is compatible with any personal interests, without prejudice to any personal interests, based on personal interests for all personal interests. But the market mechanism is a certain limit, in many cases, we still have to use non-market rules to derive from the collective preferences of individual preferences. Compared with the market rules, the choice of non-market rules with all its flaws, the biggest flaw is that it can not form any personal interests without sacrificing the public interest, in the presence of paradox in the case of voting, but also impossible to derive from the personal preferences a collective preference. Public choice studies have shown that the choice of any non-market rules can not be made to meet the Arrow Impossibility Theorem conditions, it can not replace the market mechanism of political voting. Therefore, the political must be allowed to vote in the market economy, establishment of the whole community as far as possible on the basis of market choice, public choice space compression and expansion for the self-orientation of public choice, on the fact Shixian Zheng constraints. (Note omitted) Relevance: Thesis, Free Thesis, University thesis, dissertation template